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THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD COORDINATION 
RULES: THE ONGOING PROGRAM TO KEEP 
POLITICS UNDER CONTROL 
Robert F. Bauer∗
There is a quality even meaner than outright ugliness or disorder, and this 
meaner quality is the dishonest mark of pretended order, achieved by 
ignoring or suppressing the real order that is struggling to exist and to be 
served.
 
1
 
I.  CAMPAIGN LAW AND CITY PLANNING: COORDINATION 
 
Campaign finance regulation is not widely classified as “urban law,” 
except, of course, to the extent that municipalities, like other units of 
government, may impose controls on political monies raised and spent to 
influence city elections.  This latter sense is a narrow one: it does not 
support the application of the term “urban law.”  But there are ways of 
thinking about cities, about the qualities of urban life and the challenges of 
urban planning, that illuminate, if only by analogy, the special difficulties 
presented by modern attempts to regulate politics.  There is always 
occasion for a different angle of vision on the nature of those difficulties, 
and this Essay attempts to present one. 
The particular thought about cities that provides the point of departure is 
that of Jane Jacobs.  Jacobs sharply criticized urban planning that did not 
respect the special rhythms and inner structure of city life.  The tradition of 
planning she assailed in her book, The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities, exhibited, to her mind, “great disrespect for the subject matter 
itself—cities.”2  Of Ebenezer Howard, the English planner responsible for 
the concept of the Garden City, she wrote that “he hated the city and 
thought it an outright evil and an affront to nature.”3
 
∗ Partner, Chair of the Political Law Group, Perkins Coie.  J.D., University of Virginia, 
1976; B.A., Harvard College, 1973.   
  It was, for him, a 
 1. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 21 (1993). 
 2. Id. at 567. 
 3. Id. at 28. 
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“Megalopolis, Tyrannapolis, Necropolis, a monstrosity, a tyranny, a living 
death.”4  Howard proposed, in effect, to subdue the city, for he “conceived 
of planning also as essentially paternalistic, if not authoritarian.  He was 
uninterested in the aspects of the City which could not be abstracted to 
serve his Utopia.  In particular, he simply wrote off the intricate, many-
faceted, cultural life of the metropolis.”5
Howard, and others like him, could not see cities as “lively, diverse, 
intense”
 
6 or examples of “organized complexity”7 constructed from the 
“interrelations of . . . many factors.”8  Planners with his vision saw them 
instead as a form of corruption, an enemy of nature, inconsistent with 
“purity, nobility and beneficence.”9
This manner of thinking that reveals anxiety toward disorder and the 
threat of “corruption” it poses, might also bring to mind the contemporary 
conceptions of politics on which modern campaign finance reforms rest.  
Politics in its natural state is restless, untamed, and aggressive, and its way 
is that of ceaseless bargaining, untrammeled speech, and shifting 
alliances—all shaped by both high ideals and ruthless self-interest.  The 
law of the land has progressed steadily toward a comprehensive regime of 
controls, a form of planning, enforced by legal sanction, and intended to 
introduce into the political form “purity, nobility and beneficence.”
 
10  This 
consists of conceptions of “clean” politics conduced through elevated 
dialogue on the “merits” without the contamination of self-interested 
pursuits or the special advantages achieved through the possession of great 
wealth.11
The field of political regulation affords many examples of how this 
vision has been pursued, but none seems as apt for the present purpose as 
the restrictions imposed in the most recent round of campaign finance 
reform known as McCain-Feingold (or in the House, Shays-Meehan).
 
12
 
 4. Id. 
  
 5. Id. at 26. 
 6. Id. at 585. 
 7. Id. at 564. 
 8. Id. at 566. 
 9. Id. at 580. 
 10. Id. 
 11. There is vast literature on what is wrong with politics and what could be done to 
right it.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, MONEY IN POLITICS (l980); see BROOKS JACKSON, 
HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); see also 
AMITAI ETZIONI, CAPITOL CORRUPTION: AN ASSAULT ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1984).  
There is also recent case history pertaining to unhappiness with money in politics.  See 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 12. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
 (2002) [hereinafter BCRA]. 
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Among its provisions, in particular, are those restricting “coordination” 
with candidates and political parties.13  The “coordination” rules are 
intended to enforce the limits on contributions to candidates and parties.14  
Congress is concerned specifically with circumvention of those limits: the 
threat of circumvention is addressed by restricting political 
communications and also political relationships.15
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “COORDINATION” 
  More than most features 
of campaign finance reform, “coordination rules,” in the name of law 
enforcement, attack the roots of political discourse and commerce.  
Additionally, more than most features, they illustrate how a fundamental 
distrust of political life in its lush variety and “organized complexity” 
shapes the rules applied to politics, but not logically or clearly for the 
better. 
A. “Expressive Coordinated Expenditures” and the Christian 
Coalition 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 defines various limits on 
contributions to candidates and political committees, and certain forms of 
spending.16  For example, contributions from corporations and unions are 
banned altogether.17  The limits apply to the direct donation of cash, but 
also to the in-kind payment of goods and services supplied to the 
candidate.18  The law for some years contained a limitation in the form of 
an anti-coordination rule, providing generally that an “expenditure” of 
funds would be treated as a contribution to a candidate if made “in 
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion 
of, a candidate.”19
For some time, it was unclear how the coordination rules were much 
different in nature than the proposition that a contribution could be made 
  The idea was straightforward: if candidate Wilson 
hypothetically could not pay for 1000 brochures, but prevailed upon the 
Chamber of Commerce to do so, and then the Chamber financed a benefit 
for the candidate, it would be properly treated as a “contribution” subject to 
the same legal requirements as any other. 
 
 13. See id. § 214. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 350-58. 
 16. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002). 
 17. Id. § 441a(a)(5). 
 18. Id. § 431(8)(A)(i). 
 19. Id. § 441a(a)(7)(A)-(B)(i). 
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directly or in-kind.  In other words, the coordination provision of the law 
was a standard regulatory measure, perhaps redundant, but not, in 
interpretation or enforcement, very intrusive or significant. 
Toward the end of the last century this changed when complaints arose 
over substantial spending for advertising and other public communications 
by large, influential membership organizations.20  This was the era of “soft 
money,” and especially ushered in the use of these funds to finance “issue 
advertising” by political parties, unions, and corporations.21
The Christian Coalition drew the complaint, and subsequently entered 
into protracted conflict with the Federal Election Commission over its 
distribution of voter guides and “Congressional scorecards,” assigning 
ratings, favorable and unfavorable, to candidates with voting records on the 
issues important to the Coalition.
  The path to 
the reformed “coordination” rules started with a partisan complaint and a 
lawsuit. 
22  The complainants, followed by the 
government, alleged that the Coalition had “coordinated” its distribution 
with candidates and political party committees and, hence, made illegal 
contributions to them.23  This dispute came before United States District 
Court Judge Joyce Hens Green in the case Christian Coalition v. FEC.24
Judge Green was concerned that the FEC have available tools to enforce 
the law, but also that the tools be fashioned with care.  She focused 
particular attention on a certain type of expenditures, which she termed 
“expressive coordinated expenditures.”
 
25  These were, like the Coalition’s 
voter guides, beneficial to the candidates favorably rated in them, but also 
“expressively” significant to the Coalition in setting out its views on public 
policy.  The judge defined communications of this kind as ones for which 
“the spender is responsible for a substantial part of the speech and for 
which the spender’s choice of speech has been arrived at after coordination 
with the [candidate’s] campaign.”26
Judge Green wished to balance protection of the “expressive” elements 
of the communication with enforcement of the most direct forms of 
coordination that represent the specter of “circumvention” of the 
 
 
 20. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 169-70. 
 21. See id. at 126-42. 
 22. See Christian Coalition v. FEC, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id.  The Court coined the term “expressive coordinated expenditures,” while stating 
that it was “loathe to add to the already arcane vocabulary of campaign finance 
regulation . . . .”  Id. at 85 n.45. 
 26. Id. 
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contribution limits.27  The judge held that this sort of “express coordinated 
expenditure” could only be treated as “coordinated” for legal purposes, that 
is, restricted under the contribution limits, if the candidate had direct 
control over the expenditure, or had engaged in “substantial discussion” 
with the spender over its contents, timing, location, intended audience, or 
other material factors bearing on its creation and distribution.28  The 
discussion would have to rise, for this purpose, to a particular level, such 
that the candidate and spender would have achieved a meeting of the 
minds, acting as “partners or joint venturers.”29
The FEC proceeded to incorporate Judge Green’s holding into an 
administrative rule.  The rule tracked her decision closely, adopting the 
twin standards of candidate control and substantial discussion resulting in 
“collaboration or agreement.”
 
30  It provided further that “substantial 
discussion or negotiation may be evidenced by one or more meetings, 
conversations or conferences regarding the value or importance of the 
communication for a particular election.”31  The  FEC also provided that 
the candidate or the spender would be liable under the rule for the actions 
of their “agents,” but not for answering “an inquiry regarding the 
candidate’s or party’s positions on legislative or public policy positions.”32
The Christian Coalition decision marked a shift in the significance of 
the “coordination” rule.  It was no longer a regulatory aid of uncertain 
scope and effectiveness in the enforcement of the contribution limits.  It 
had become a more detailed mechanism for screening conversations about 
political matters, or contacts between political alliesfor imposing order 
where disorder might breed “circumvention.”  The rule was concerned 
specifically with “communication”by its terms it established the basis for 
government inquiry into “discussions,” obligating the agency, upon its own 
initiative or upon complaint, to inquire into those details, and specifically 
the “substantiality” of communications between political allies.
 
33  One 
“meeting, conversation or conference” would suffice to bring those 
discussions within the sphere of regulation and place those involved at risk 
of liability.34
 
 27. See id. 
 
 28. Id. at 92. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23(c)(2)(iii) (2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 100.23(d), (e)(3). 
 33. Id. § 100.23(c)(2)(iii). 
 34. Id. 
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B.  McCain-Feingold and “Coordination” 
With intense attention to “issue advertising,” financed with “soft 
money,” reform efforts in campaign finance proceeded with fresh 
momentum, resulting in the development and the passage of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”).35  In the course of the l996 presidential 
campaign cycle, the FEC had confronted new claims that large 
organizations, in the labor and business communities, had “coordinated” 
massive expenditures, illegally, with candidates and political party 
committees.36  Extensive investigations had failed to produce enforcement 
actions, motivating the sponsors of BCRA to develop among its proposed 
provisions new, more comprehensive anti-coordination rules.37
The original proposals for strengthening the “coordination” rules drew 
immediate expressions of concern, from a variety of quarters, about serious 
impediments to political speech and association.
 
38  Concerned that these 
objections would endanger passage of the bill, Senator McCain supported a 
“reasonable compromise.”39  While he stood by the position that 
“coordinated” activities constituted “a major circumvention of the law,” 
McCain agreed that Congress should direct the FEC to develop a new rule 
rather than prescribe one in detail.40  As Senator Feingold stated on the 
floor, the approach was to “give some guidance to the FEC . . . without 
actually dictating the result.”41
Section 214 of BCRA provided that guidance, repealing the rule inspired 
by Christian Coalition, while directing the FEC to promulgate a new one 
with attention to specific factors.  The law required the FEC to “address” in 
the new rules: 
 
 
• Payments for the republication of campaign materials; 
 
• Payments for the use of a common vendor; 
 
 
 35. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 36. See AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2001); see also In re Coalition, 
Nat’l Republican Cong. Comm., Fed. Election Comm’n MUR 4624 (Sept. 6, 2001) 
(statements for the Record, Commissioner Karl J. Sandstrom), available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/0000018C.pdf. 
 37. See 147 CONG. REC.  S3184 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
 Feingold). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See 147 CONG. REC. S3184 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 147 CONG. REC. S3185 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
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• Payments for communications directed or made by persons who 
previously served as an employee of a candidate or a political 
party; and 
 
• Payments for communications made by a person after 
substantial discussion about the communication with a candidate 
or political party.42
 
 
Other than these factors, the law mandated that the FEC exclude from 
the rule any requirement of “agreement or formal collaboration to establish 
coordination.”43
Before the FEC could develop the rule, however, it was required to 
defend the statute from constitutional challenge.  In McConnell v. FEC, the 
Court was asked to rule specifically on the constitutional implications of 
excluding from any final coordination rule a requirement of agreement or 
formal collaboration.
  From these factors, along with the elimination of any 
requirement of agreement or formal collaboration, it was apparent that a 
major regulatory expansion of coordination restrictions was likely. 
44  The Court made short work of this concern, 
stressing that the coordination rules only restricted expenditures that failed 
the test of “total independence” of the candidate.45  The Court held that 
those expenditures falling short of “total independence” presented a 
legitimate threat of circumvention of contribution limits through subtle 
understandings between candidates and spenders.46
The Court also noted, somewhat disingenuously, that the coordination 
rules had gone without constitutional challenge for some three decades, 
suggesting to the justices that there was little evidence of “chilled” 
speech.
 
47  Of course, the coordination rules had changed shape, as had 
enforcement policies, over the course of those three decades, and at least as 
of the l990s, the Christian Coalition and AFL-CIO cases suggested a 
mounting conflict between political activity and the “coordination” 
restrictions.  The Court took a reassuring view of matters, rejecting a 
challenge premised on a likely “chilling” of political activity.48
 
 42. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 214(c)(1)-(4), 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  The constitutional implications were possible freedom of 
speech violations.  Id. 
 45. Id. at 221. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 222-23. 
 48. See id. 
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III. THE POST-BCRA FEC “COORDINATION” RULES 
The Commission did as the statute commanded, and it promulgated rules 
“addressing” each of the factors specified in Section 214.49
The rules defined “coordinated communications” in terms of a three-
pronged test, which examined both the “content” of the speech and the 
“conduct” of the candidates, the spender, and those associated with them.  
An expenditure could only be coordinated if it met one or more of both the 
“content” and “conduct” standards. 
  The direction 
taken by the FEC added to the complexity of the rules, but also to their 
invasiveness as applied to political communication and association.  
Additionally, it did so without achieving clarity or internal consistency.  
The agency could not be faulted, as the escalated treatment of coordination 
was commanded by the terms of the new law. 
 
“Content” for coordination purposes would include: 
 
• An “electioneering communication.”  A public communication 
that refers to a clearly identified candidate, financed by a 
corporation or union, or any other entity, within 30 days of a 
primary election or 60 days of a general election;50
 
 
• The public dissemination, distribution or republication of a 
candidate’s own campaign materials;51
 
 
•  A public communication that (a) refers to a political party or a 
clearly identified Federal candidate; (b) is publicly distributed or 
disseminated within 120 days of an election; and (c) is directed 
to voters where the candidate seeks election or in which the 
party has candidates running;52
 
 49. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 (2002). 
 or 
 50. Id. § 109.21(c)(1).  It should be noted that a United States District Court struck 
down section 109.21(c), holding that it undermined the essential purposes of the law.  Shays 
v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).  The Federal Election Commission appealed this 
ruling, however, and the appeal is pending as of this writing.  See Press Release, Federal 
Election Commission, FEC Votes on Specifics of Shays v. FEC Appeal (Oct. 29, 2004), 
available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041029shays.html; see also 11 C.F.R.  
§ 100.26 (stating that a “public communication” includes broadcast communications, print 
advertising, direct mail, and phone banking (with direct mail and phone banking defined as 
mailed or phoned communications consisting of more than 500 identical or substantially 
similar messages transmitted within a thirty day period)). 
 51. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(2). 
 52. Id. § 109.21(c)(4)(ii)-(iii). 
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• A public communication that expressly advocates the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.53
 
 
If the “content” standard is satisfied, then the question is whether the 
communication occurred with the involvement of the candidate or any of 
the candidate’s agents.54
 
  This is the “conduct” standard, and any of the 
following kinds of “conduct,” that is, involvement by the candidate or her 
agents, would subject a communication with the described content to a 
finding of “coordination.” 
The “conduct standards” are structured to include whether: 
 
• The communication is created, produced or distributed at the 
request, suggestion or with the assent of the beneficiary;55
 
 
• The beneficiary is materially involved in decisions over: (a) 
content; (b) intended audience; (c) means or mode; (d) specific 
media outlets; (e) timing or frequency; or (f) size, prominence or 
duration;56
 
 
• There have been one or more substantial discussions between 
the payor and the beneficiary where material information about 
plans, projects, or needs is conveyed;57
 
 
• The payor uses a common vendor to create, produce or 
distribute the communications,58 when (a) the vendor has 
provided certain services to the beneficiary,59
 
 53. Id. § 109.21(c)(3). 
 and (b) the vendor 
then uses or conveys to the payor material information about the 
beneficiary’s plans, projects or needs, or information used 
 54. See id. § 109.21(d). 
 55. Id. § 109.21(d)(1)(i)-(ii). 
 56. Id. § 109.21(d)(2)(i)-(vi). 
 57. Id. § 109.21(d)(3). 
 58. Id. § 109.21(d)(4). 
 59. Id. § 109.21(d)(4)(ii).  These services include: development of media strategy; 
selection of audiences; polling; fundraising; developing the content of a public 
communication; producing a public communication; identifying voters or developing lists; 
selecting personnel, contractors, or subcontractors; or consulting or otherwise providing 
political or media advice.  Id. § 109.21(2)(4)(ii)(A)-(I). 
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previously in providing services to the beneficiary;60
 
 or 
• The person financing the communication was, or employs 
someone who was, an employee or independent contractor of the 
beneficiary during the current election cycle; and that person 
then uses or conveys material information about the 
beneficiary’s plans, projects or needs, or material information 
used previously in providing services to the beneficiary.61
 
 
The three prongs work as follows.  First, someone other than the 
candidate, such as a corporation, a union, or any person, must have paid for 
a “communication.”62  Second, the communication must meet one of the 
“content” standards, such as a communication expressly advocating a 
candidate's election or defeat.63  Third, there must be some connection 
between the communication having the required content and some 
“conduct” by the candidate and the spender, or their political allies.64  The 
candidate must have requested or suggested the expenditure; been 
“materially involved” in its creation or distribution; or engaged in 
“substantial discussions” about the expenditure with some “material” effect 
on how it was created or distributed.65  This connection might be direct, 
linking the candidate and the spender in these contacts or discussions, or 
might be indirectly achieved by the candidate’s “agents” or even former 
employees of the candidate who carry this information with them to the 
spender.66
The coordination rules are necessarily intricate in design and aggressive 
in their impact because the problem they define is notoriously difficult to 
solve.
 
67
 
 60. Id. § 109.2(d)(4)(iii). 
  The activities they seek to control are the very stuff of politics: 
negotiations and discussions, the relationships with allies and operatives, 
the struggle for control between politicians and interests, and the broad 
range of communications to the public that, while expressing only 
indirectly their true election influencing purpose, have that purpose at their 
core.  Politics is not an all frontal attack, but vastly more complex in its 
 61. Id. § 109.21(d)(5). 
 62. Id. § 109.21(a)(1). 
 63. Id. § 109.21(a)(2). 
 64. Id. § 109.21(a)(3). 
 65. Id. § 109.21(d)(1)-(3). 
 66. Id. § 109.21(d)(5). 
 67. See 147 CONG. REC. S3184 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) 
(remarking on the difficulty of the problem). 
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working and varied in the strategies adopted and tactics employed.  The 
coordination rules have been built out to exacting specifications to identify 
and restrict those features of these activities considered important to “law 
enforcement.”  In short, the coordination rules seek to impose a form of 
legal order on a system of creative disorder—to clear a path of sorts 
through the political clamor that is perceptible to all and effectively 
enforceable. 
Rules of this kind are unsurprisingly hard to write clearly and sharply, 
without doing damage to the environment in which they operate.  This is 
apparent from considering the key rules at closer quarters, with attention to 
how the federal agency has explained their design and function. 
A. Bad Timing 
Some of the content requirements followed logically enough from the 
purposes of the statute.  One example is the content standard tied to express 
advocacy of a candidate’s election or defeat, and another, closely related to 
the original concern with enforcing limits on in-kind contributions, is the 
standard concerned with the “dissemination, distribution or republication of 
a candidate’s own campaign materials.”68
But a fairly dramatic expansion of the law appears in the form of a 
“content standard” that looks to whether the communications simply “refer 
to a party or candidate” within 120 days of an election.
 
69  The FEC 
explained that this standard was content neutral, but still structured to 
sweep up coordinated activities “reasonably close to an election.”70  It was, 
the agency insisted, a “bright-line test,” and it required little 
“characterization of the meaning or the content of the communication, or 
inquiry into . . . subjective effect.”71
The Commission offered an additional justification, one particularly 
revealing about the systematic expansion in the coordination rules.  
Congress had imposed in BCRA very specific restrictions on union and 
corporate spending for broadcast advertising that referred to candidates 
within thirty to sixty days of a primary or general election, respectively.
 
72
 
 68. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(3). 
  
This was not a coordination rule—it applied to corporate and union 
spending without regard to coordination of any type with a candidate.  Yet 
the Commission, seeking to avoid “arbitrariness” and achieve 
 69. Id. § 109.21(c)(4)(i)-(iii). 
 70. Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 430 (Jan. 3, 2003). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II)(aa)-(bb) (2004). 
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“consistency,” introduced into the coordination rules what it termed a 
“parallel requirement” for coordinated communications occurring within a 
specific time frame, in this instance, 120 days before an election.73
The path cleared by the law had significantly broadened, as the 
government turned attention in this way to whether a communication 
“referred” to a candidate within a specified period before an election.
  In other 
words, the law had begun to develop according to its own internal dynamic, 
spinning out additional restrictions in the interests of “consistency” and 
avoidance of “arbitrariness.” 
74  
Defined as a “content” standard, it was constructed also with reference to 
factors beyond timing: to whether the ad occurred “reasonably close to an 
election.”75
The consequences of this approach became clear in an early application 
of this aspect of the rule.  A congressional candidate in a special election 
wished to have President Bush appear in her advertising.
  So it was a content standard, but it was still more, and it was 
justified by the argument that since the law had asserted a comparable 
claim against corporations and unions, it should be applied in like fashion 
against anyone—individuals, associations, or political committees—that 
coordinated expenditures within four months of an election. 
76  The FEC held 
that, within 120 days of the presidential primary in her state, the 
appearance of the President in her ad would be a coordinated expenditure—
a contribution to the President, even though he was appearing in her ad, for 
her benefit.77  But because the President agreed to appear with her for this 
purpose, and because the ad was run with the “material involvement of the 
President,” it was a coordinated expenditure, a contribution to him.  The 
FEC advised him that he could avoid the problem by paying for his share 
of the ad.78
B.  Subtle Speech, “Material” Speech 
  The President, in short, had to pay for the right to endorse one 
of his party’s candidates. 
Another novel expansion in the rule took the form of a rule governing 
candidate “assent” to a proposed expenditure.79
 
 73. Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 430. 
  For the coordination 
restriction to apply, the candidate would not need to assent in specific 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See FEC Advisory Op. 2004-1 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/040001.html. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)(ii) (2005). 
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terms: “assent” might be indicated in a number of ways.  A determination 
of whether the candidate had “assented” to such a request or suggestion 
was “fact-based.”80  It was not enough for the candidate to be informed of 
the plan for an expenditure and, additionally, the FEC reassured candidates 
that “by rejecting the suggestion, the candidate or political party committee 
may unilaterally avoid any coordination.”81
The Commission also included a standard in the form of “substantial 
discussion,” like the one adopted by Judge Green and incorporated into the 
Commission’s post-Christian Coalition rule.
 
82  Closely related to it was a 
standard of “material involvement” in the creation, production, and 
distribution of the communication.83  The Commission conceded some 
overlap between the two standards: for example, a candidate who delivered 
polling to a spender might not engage in substantial discussion of a 
proposed expenditure, but the provision of the data would constitute 
“material involvement” in the creation of the ad.84
The two standards were connected in still another way, because the 
Commission advised the regulated community that under the new rules, 
“substantiality is measured by . . . materiality.”
 
85  But, what is 
“materiality”?  Here, words appear to have failed the agency, for it offered 
a series of dictionary definitions, loosely connected and somewhat vague in 
the telling.  Thus, the Commission noted that a candidate’s “material” 
involvement in an ad, or the scope of “materiality” required for there to 
have occurred a “substantial discussion,” turned on the “importance, degree 
of necessity, influence or the effect of involvement by the candidate.”86  
This did not mean, the Commission was quick to add, that coordination 
depended on a showing that “but for” the candidate’s discussion or 
involvement, the ad would not have occurred.87  “Influence” would be 
enough, and of course, be adjudicated on a case by case basis.88
The rules also followed Congress’ lead in setting aside, decisively, any 
requirement of agreement or formal collaboration.  The rule on this point 
was far-reaching: coordination could occur even if there was no “mutual 
understanding” or “meeting of the mind” on “any aspect” of the 
 
 
 80. Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 432 (Jan. 3, 2003).  
 81. Id. 
 82. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(3). 
 83. Id. § 109.21(d)(2). 
 84. Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 433. 
 85. Id. at 435. 
 86. Id. at 433. 
 87. Id. at 433-34. 
 88. Id. at 433. 
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communication.89
Taken together, these standards allowed for a close government inquiry 
into various forms of “assent,” even if not explicit, to propositions about 
advertising, but made clear that a “mutual understanding” or “meeting of 
the minds” was not required for enforcement action to proceed.  The 
government would examine “substantiality” and “materiality,” defining one 
in terms of the other, and it would have to consider all the “facts” closely in 
doing so.  Political communications and understandings in all their 
complexity would be subject to close inspection and the application of free-
floating definitions.  Here two worlds collide: the vital, sometimes chaotic, 
even surreptitious world of politics, and the demands of the legal “order.” 
 
C. Problematic Relationships 
Specific relationships could trigger the application of the coordination 
under the new rules.90  The rules, as directed by Congress, required 
attention to the activities of “agents” for candidates or parties, the use of 
“common vendors,” and/or the information possessed and passed on by a 
candidate’s “former” employees or independent contractors.91  These 
businesses or individuals could leave a coordination finding in their wake if 
they conveyed to the spender, on the basis of their prior association with 
the candidate, information material to an expenditure, or if they even 
“used” such material information.92
The candidate might know that this information had been conveyed or 
used, and the FEC, recognizing this point, made special provision for it.
 
93  
In this case, coordination would result in the making of a prohibited 
contribution to the candidate who was formerly the employer, but it would 
not result in the candidate “receiving it.”94  Liability would run only one 
way: the contribution would be complete for these purposes, but would 
somehow not reach its intended recipient, who would not be deemed to 
have received it, even if he or she benefited from it.95
This concern with relationships did not appease supporters of the 
original legislation, including the congressional sponsors.
 
96
 
 89. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (2005). 
  They were 
 90. Id. § 109.21(d). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 109.21(d)(5)(i)-(ii). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. § 109.21(b)(2). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 49064, 49081-83 (July 29, 2002) (defining “agent”). 
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troubled that the Commission had defined the term “agent” to include only 
those acting with “actual authority, express or implied.”97  Agency, they 
argued, could be established also on the basis of “apparent authority,” that 
is, a reasonable belief that someone was acting for the candidate, under her 
instructions, even if this was not so.98  As noted below, a challenge to this 
aspect of the rules prompted a federal district court judge to return the rule 
to the agency for further consideration.99  The agency responded with a 
revised version of the rule, stating that it would provide for liability on the 
basis of “apparent” authority.100
No relationship could be more problematic than one for which the 
candidate could be responsible but did not actually know about or 
authorize.  The new rules, entering actively into the domain of political 
alliances, operated not only to limit relationships, but now also, at least for 
legal purposes, to create them. 
 
IV. THE AFTERMATH AND A CONCLUSION 
The FEC, upon issuing its rules, was sued by the congressional sponsors 
for failing to effect congressional intent with sufficient rules.101  The 
United States District Court hearing the case upheld various complaints, 
including the rule’s delineation of only a “120 day” period prior to an 
election, when a broadcast or other paid public “reference” to a candidate 
could be treated as coordination; the agency’s decision to exclude Internet 
communications; and, as noted, the FEC’s definition of the term “agent.”102  
The rulemaking had evidently not ended, nor had dissatisfaction about the 
reach or comprehensiveness of the rules.103
In this way, the coordination rules are intended to provide order to 
 
 
 97. 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(b). 
 98. See Prohibited and Excessive Contributions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 49081-83; see also 
Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 423-25 (Jan. 3, 2003) 
(defining “agent”). 
 99. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 100. See Definition of “Agent” for BCRA Regulations on Non-Federal Funds or Soft 
Money and Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 70 Fed. Reg. 5382 (Feb. 2, 2005). 
 101. See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 35. 
 102. Id. at 64-65, 70-72. 
 103. The FEC appealed five of the fifteen rules overturned by the court.  One of those 
appealed was the “120 day” coordination rule.  See Brief of Federal Election Commission, 
Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5352).  The FEC did not appeal 
the court’s judgment that the Internet could not be removed wholesale from the scope of 
“public communications” subject to the coordination restrictions.  As of this writing, the 
Agency, amid some considerable concern in the blogosphere, has proposed new rules to 
regulate Internet politics.  See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Internet Communications, 
70 Fed. Reg. 16967 (Apr. 4, 2005). 
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politics—to guard against circumventions, against conversations that spill 
over into “substantial discussions” and “material involvements,” and 
against relationships that might be exploited for the covert communication 
of sensitive political information.  Those in the disorderly and complex 
business of politics must watch what they say and whom they hire: they 
must prepare themselves for “fact-based” inquiries into whether, having 
actually agreed to a proposal for some spending of benefit, they might have 
indicated “assent.”  In this world, agreement, a meeting of the minds, or 
mutual understanding, is immaterial.  What matters is the thoroughgoing 
imposition of order on political life. 
This preoccupation with order and control, like the order passionately 
pursued by Jane Jacobs’s planners, follows from a similar source.  It is a 
distrust of politics, even a disdain for it; and a belief that if not controlled 
and even subdued, it will foster only corruption.  The myriad 
understandings, bargains, associations, and forms of communication 
fundamental to political life represent in this view the means of effecting 
corruption—not something “intricate” and “many-faceted,” nor the 
expression of “organized complexity.” 
 
